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Abstract: Increasingly users are seen as the weak link in the chain, when it comes to the 
security of corporate information. Should the users of computer systems act in any 
inappropriate or insecure manner, then they may put their employers in danger of financial 
losses, information degradation or litigation, and themselves in danger of dismissal or 
prosecution. This is a particularly important concern for knowledge-intensive organisations, 
such as Universities, as the effective conduct of their core teaching and research activities is 
becoming ever more reliant on the availability, integrity and accuracy of computer-based 
information resources. One increasingly important mechanism for reducing the occurrence of 
inappropriate behaviours, and in so doing, protecting corporate information, is through the 
formulation and application of a formal ‘acceptable use policy (AUP). Whilst the AUP has 
attracted some academic interest, it has tended to be prescriptive and overly focussed on 
the role of the Internet, and there is relatively little empirical material that explicitly addresses 
the purpose, positioning or content of real acceptable use policies. The broad aim of the 
study, reported in this paper, is to fill this gap in the literature by critically examining the 
structure and composition of a sample of authentic policies – taken from the higher 
education sector - rather than simply making general prescriptions about what they ought to 
contain. There are two important conclusions to be drawn from this study: 1) the primary role 
of the AUP appears to be as a mechanism for dealing with unacceptable behaviour, rather 
than proactively promoting desirable and effective security behaviours, and 2) the wide 
variation found in the coverage and positioning of the reviewed policies is unlikely to be 
fostering a coherent approach to security management, across the higher education sector. 
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1 Introduction 
All forms of modern organisation, whether they are operating in the public or the private 
sector, have become far more dependent upon a wide range of information technologies to 
support all aspects of their strategic and operational activities. Although such technologies 
may have the potential to deliver many important benefits, in practice, their contribution is 
often comprised, because of the unacceptably high levels of security breaches experienced 
[Garg et al, 2003; Whitman, 2004]. Ensuring the security of corporate information, that is 
increasingly stored, processed and disseminated using information and communications 
technologies [ICTs], has therefore become an extremely complex and challenging activity 
[Doherty et al, 2009]. Whilst many security problems can be attributed to the activities of 
external agencies and events, there is growing evidence that a high proportion of security 
problems are the result of errors, oversights or malpractices perpetrated by an organisation’s 
own employees [Stanton et al, 2005]. Indeed, it has been noted that growing numbers of 
employers have had to discipline their own employees because they have breached 
organisational security policies and protocols [Stephen & Petropoulakis, 2007]. Breaches of 
information security range from the intentional acts of malicious behaviour through to naïve 
mistakes [Stanton et al, 2005], and cover issues such as: sharing passwords; forgetting to 
take back-ups; leaving PCs unattended; sharing sensitive information with outside parties, 
etc. [Leach, 2003]. 
 
One obvious response to the increasing variety of security threats to the effective use of 
corporate IT [Dhillon & Backhouse, 1996; Patel et al, 2008] is to implement a portfolio of the 
many technological fixes and defences, such as firewalls, patches, antivirus and content 
filtering software, that are now available [Ng et al, 2009; Herath & Rao, 2009a; Rhee et al, 
2009]. Although such sophisticated technical tools, may play an important role in improving 
information security, particularly with respect to protecting an organisation from external 
threats, they are less well suited to detecting naïve, negligent or destructive employee 
behaviours [Ng et al, 2009]. Indeed, it can be argued that most organisational 
conceptualisations of information security are far too techno-centric [Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 
2006], and that they typically ignore more socio-organizational issues such as trust, ethicality 
and the integrity of employees [Dhillon & Backhouse, 2000]. This may be a potentially 
dangerous oversight, because, no matter how sophisticated an organisation’s technical 
defences, its information security ‘ultimately depends on end user behaviour’ [Rhee et al, 
2009: p. 2].  
 
For the majority of organisations, the most obvious and appropriate strategy to control the 
behaviour of their computer users, is by introducing and enforcing an acceptable use [or 
‘usage’] policy [Foltz et al, 2008]. Such policies have been defined as the set of rules that are 
formulated, typically by senior IT managers, to clearly and explicitly define how all 
organizational computing resources may, or may not, be used by employees [Nolan, 2005]. 
Such policies are now extremely widely used, but they have, as yet, attracted very little 
explicit attention in the academic literature. Moreover, in the small number of instances in 
which the AUP has been the subject of academic research, the studies have tended to 
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restrict their focus to Internet or telecommunications usage only [Lichtenstein & Swatman, 
1997; Whitman et al, 1999; Siau et al, 2002].  
 
Against this backdrop, the broad aim of the study, reported in this paper, is to help fill the 
significant gap in the literature with regard to the purpose, content and positioning of actual 
acceptable use policies, by empirically addressing the following research question: To what 
extent is a sample of genuine, and currently operational, AUPs effectively fulfilling their 
primary purpose, that is to clearly articulate to users how all organizational computing 
resources may, or may not, be used? More specifically, we wanted to both explore the 
extent to which best practice was being followed, in the areas in which it already exists, and 
to develop new insights, with regard to the many facets of AUP design that have as yet not 
been the subject of academic scrutiny. In particular, we were keen to investigate the extent 
to which best practice was being followed in terms of the purpose and content of the AUP, 
and the extent to which best practice could be established with respect to the positioning of 
such policies. In terms of the arena in which this study might best be conducted, we chose to 
focus on universities, because as knowledge-intensive organizations, the quality and 
security of their information assets should be a very high priority, for all organisations, right 
across the sector [Mok, 2005]. The remainder of this paper is organized into the following 
five sections: a review of the literature and a description of the research objectives; a 
discussion of the research methods employed; a presentation of the findings; a discussion of 
their importance and finally the conclusions and recommendations for future research.  
 
2 Contextual Background 
The aims of this section are threefold. Firstly we seek to review the literature, with regard to 
the justification for adopting an acceptable use policy, in terms of its stated purpose and 
objectives. Secondly, we investigate the extent to which the content of such policies has 
been addressed in the literature. Finally, the literature is summarised and critiqued, the gaps 
in it are identified, and the study’s specific objectives articulated. Although for the purposes 
of this paper we have chosen to use the term ‘acceptable use policy’, as it appears to be the 
most commonly used, it should be noted that in some organisations and literatures, other 
terms are used to describe the very same type of document. Consequently, this literature 
review has also targeted contributions that address ‘Acceptable Usage Policies’ [Stephen & 
Petropoulakis, 2007], ‘Computer Use Policies’ [Scott & Voss, 1994]; ‘End-user Policies’ 
[Herath & Rao, 2009b] and ‘Computer Usage Policies’ [Foltz et al, 2008], as their purpose 
and content is wholly relevant to the objectives of this study. Moreover, some other types of 
policy have also been included in this review – e.g. the ‘Internet Acceptable Use Policy’ 
[Lichtenstein, 1996; Stewart, 2000] and the ‘Telecommunications Policy’ [Whitman et al, 
1999] – as even though they are restricted in their focus, they are very similar in terms of 
their broad purpose. 
 
2.1 The Objectives of the AUP 
When it comes to enforcing the security of organisational information resources, users are 
increasingly seen as the weakest link in the chain [Schneier, 2000]. Indeed, many 
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organisations now view internal security threats to be a far more pressing issue, than 
external threats, such as hackers, viruses or natural disasters [Leach, 2003]. As the internal 
threat is often the result of poor security practices, on the part of the user, it can be argued 
that increasing user awareness, particular with regard to what behaviours are acceptable 
and unacceptable, should greatly help to nullify the internal threat [Siponen, 2000]. Against 
this backdrop, the acceptable use policy has been promoted as an organisation’s key 
defence against the internal threat. 
 
Although the Internet provides organisations with numerous business benefits, Anandarajan 
[2002] argues persuasively that it also provides employees with access to the world’s 
‘largest playground’, in which they can waste time gambling, shopping, chatting, or simply 
browsing. Although the Internet is the most obvious computer resource upon which 
employees might waste time by engaging in ‘cyber-loafing’ [Lim, 2002], it is not the only one, 
as unproductive behaviours, such as game playing, can also be witnessed on the stand-
alone PC [Everton et al, 2005]. However, it has been argued that not all forms of ‘cyber-
loafing’ are intrinsically harmful to the host organisation, particularly if they help reduce 
employee stress and burnout [Lim & Chen, 2009]. Consequently, a key aim of the AUP is to 
clearly articulate, to users, which behaviours are deemed to be appropriate and what is 
inappropriate behaviour, with respect to their use of corporate IT resources [Attaran, 2000]. 
 
Many very serious external threats such as Trojans, hackers, worms or viruses [Huang et al, 
2008] can be facilitated through naïve or sloppy user behaviour, such as poor choice of 
passwords, sharing passwords [Stanton et al, 2005] or the injudicious clicking on web links 
or opening of attachments in emails from unknown senders [Ng et al, 2009]. Consequently, 
in addition to clarifying the organisation’s position with regard to the use of its computers, 
Nolan [2005] suggests that the AUP should also aim to minimise security threats, by 
promoting user awareness and good security practices. In most countries, organisations also 
have a legal obligation to take all reasonable steps to ensure that their employees can work 
in an environment that is free from all forms of harassment and discrimination [Salter & 
Bryden, 2009]. Unfortunately, there is significant evidence to suggest that many employees 
have been tempted to behave inappropriately or illegally, in their use of information systems. 
For example, in cases in which employees have been found to have used corporate 
information technologies to harass, discriminate, defame, act obscenely or breach copyright, 
then legal cases have successfully been brought against the employer [Herath and 
Wijayanayake, 2009]. Consequently, Scott [1997] highlights the important role that the AUP 
should also play in minimising the threat of litigation that organisations face, by making it 
clear to employees exactly what type of behaviours are absolutely unacceptable, because 
they might result in a costly law suit. 
 
Not only is it important that the AUP fulfils each of this broad roles and objectives, it is 
essential that the policy document starts with a clear articulation of its specific purpose 
[Kilman & Stamp, 2005]. Moreover, best practice suggests that the policy’s stated objectives 
should be tailored to the organisational context in which it will be utilised, so that it is 
explicitly aligned with the host organisation’s strategies, goals and culture, as well as the 
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specific risks that it is likely to face [Kilman & Stamp, 2005; Palmer et al, 2001; Stewart, 
2000]. 
 
2.2 The Content of the AUP 
A search of the Internet suggests that there is already a very significant body of advice, and 
established best practice, with regard to the ‘ideal’ content / structure of the acceptable [or 
computer] usage policy, in the professional arena and on the Internet. However, this subject 
has attracted far less attention, to date, in the academic literature. In one of the very few 
papers to explicitly address this topic, Holmes [2003] suggests that the computer use policy 
should address the following seven issues: 
i. monitoring use of proprietary assets;  
ii. establishing no expectation of privacy; 
iii. improper employee use; 
iv. allowable employee uses,  
v. protecting sensitive company information; 
vi. disciplinary action,  
vii. employee acknowledgement of policy 
 
Whilst the above list is one of the very few attempts to articulate, in broad terms, the 
contents of the acceptable use policy, researchers have been more forthcoming in trying to 
define the contents of the ‘Internet Acceptable Use Policy’. For example, Lichtenstein [1996] 
identified a range of issues that should be included in such a policy, and grouped these into 
legal, managerial, administrative, operational, technical and human issues. In a similar vein, 
Lichtenstein & Swatman [1997] identifies some of the broad areas that it should cover, 
including: ‘acceptable and unacceptable Internet uses’; ‘the roles and responsibilities of 
Internet users’, and ‘the sanctions for non-compliance with the policy’. In one of the very few 
empirical studies, in this domain, Siau et al [2002] investigated the contents of the ‘Internet 
Acceptable Use Policy’, but only in terms of the abuses that were explicitly covered in a 
sample of policy documents. It was found that general email abuse, unauthorised usage and 
access and copyright abuses were the most commonly occurring issues covered by the 
Internet AUP. In the only other piece of empirical research, that we could find in this area, 
Whitman et al [1999] explored the content of ‘telecommunications-use policies’. They found 
that ‘statements of policy’, ‘authorized access and usage of equipment’, and ‘prohibited 
usage of equipment’ were the most cost commonly covered issues, in their sample of 
policies.  
 
2.3 Critique of literature and research objectives 
Because of its increasingly important role in protecting organisations, and their employees, 
from costly mistakes, criminal activity and legal liability, the acceptable use policy is 
increasingly seen as one of the modern organisation’s most important codes of practice 
[Foltz et al., 2008; Holmes, 2003; Lichtenstein,1996]. However, in comparison with the long-
standing and extensive stream of literature addressing other forms of information security 
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documentation, and in particular the information security policy [e.g. Straub & Welke, 1998; 
Rees et al, 2003; Doherty & Fulford, 2005], the literature that explicitly addresses the AUP is 
still rather immature. Consequently, despite its organisational importance, its purpose, 
structure and content have not, as yet, been subjected to a great deal of empirical scrutiny, 
in the academic literature. Indeed, even where the AUP has been empirically investigated, 
the studies have tended to be rather limited in their scope, restricting their focus to either 
Internet acceptable use policies [Siau et al, 2002] or telecommunications-use policies 
[Whitman et al, 1999]. Moreover, the existing studies of the acceptable use policy have 
tended to conceptualise it as a stand-alone document [e.g. Lichenstein, 1996; Siau et al, 
2002], rather than explicitly addressing its relationship to the many other security documents, 
that, in their totality, are designed to protect and secure an organisation’s information 
resources. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, given the rapid rate of change in 
organisational IT practices, there is a need for more up to date contributions, which reflect 
current concerns and behaviours. 
 
Against this backdrop, the broad aim of the study, reported in this paper, was to critically 
examine the following three questions with respect to the design and positioning of 
acceptable use policies, as currently being used by some of the world’s leading Higher 
Education Institutions [HEIs]: 
i. What are the objectives of the acceptable use policies, as explicitly stated within the 
policy document? 
ii. What specific issues and topics do acceptable use policies explicitly cover? 
iii. How are acceptable use policies positioned, in terms of their explicit relationships 
with other information security documents? 
It was envisaged that in addressing these questions a number important new contributions 
would be made to the literature. In particular it would help to establish the extent to which the 
stated purpose, the coverage and the positioning of AUPs was helping to promote 
acceptable behaviours, whilst restricting the incidence of unacceptable activities. Moreover, 
it would provide important new insights into how the purpose, coverage and positioning of 
genuine AUPs differ from the theory, as prescribed in the literature. It was also anticipated, 
that in empirically investigating the design of current policies, many important new issues 
and insights would be generated, that have, as yet, not been addressed in the extant 
literature. 
 
3 Research Design and Methods 
As our overarching aim was to understand the purpose, content and positioning of 
acceptable use policies, it made sense to critically examine actual policy documents, so that 
each could be processed and inspected in exactly the same way. To this end, we ultimately 
chose to focus our study on the AUPs of higher education institutions, as by and large, 
universities have been prepared to publish their core IT policies on their Internet sites. More 
specifically, our sampling frame consisted of the top 100 universities from the World 
University Rankings 2008 produced by the Time Higher Education Supplement (THES, 
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2008). It was envisaged that the world’s leading universities, being at the leading edge of 
both academic and research activities, would also be at the frontier of effective information 
protection practices, via a coherent information security management programme. 
Furthermore, the use of THES rankings enabled us to target influential universities from a 
range of countries. However, given the difficulties of reviewing policies that weren’t written in 
the native tongue of the research team, the sample was restricted to universities, based 
within English-speaking countries. The focus on English-speaking universities was not only 
governed by language considerations, but was also justified because countries such as 
USA, United Kingdom and Australia, amongst other English-speaking countries, dominate 
the rankings. More specifically, a total of 70 English-speaking universities were identified in 
the World’s top 100 universities, which were based in a variety of countries, namely: USA, 
United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, New Zealand and Ireland. Table 1 provides 
a break-down of this sample, in terms of the proportion from each country that make their 
AUP documents available, via their website. 
 
Table 1: Breakdown of Sample 
Country No. of Universities in 
top 100 ranking 
No. of policies 
available online 
Percentage per 
country 
USA 37 32 86.5 
UK 17 17 100 
Australia 7 7 100 
Canada 4 4 100 
Hong Kong 3 3 100 
New Zealand 1 1 100 
Ireland 1 1 100 
TOTAL 70 65 93% 
 
In order to ensure that the process of data collection from each reviewed ‘acceptable use 
policy’ was consistent and accurate a pro-forma was devised. Each AUP was reviewed by 
one of the investigators and subsequently cross checked by another. The pro-forma 
comprises four main sections: university details, policy objectives, policy coverage and links 
to supplementary security documents. The first section contains the name, country, position 
in worldwide university ranking of the university together with the URL address where the 
reviewed AUP can be found. In the policy objectives section we recorded the stated aims of 
the policy, whilst the policy coverage section was used to record the specific policy areas 
covered by the university’s AUP. Finally, the fourth section was used to record details of any 
ancillary or supplementary policies, regulations and codes of practice that were also 
publically available on the universities’ web-sites.  
 
To ensure that the task of evaluating the content of policy documentation was conducted 
consistently, we created a classification of common policy issues that should be addressed 
in an AUP. In contrast to the information security policy [ISO, 2005], there is no common 
standard governing the design of AUPs. Consequently, a variety of other sources, ranging 
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from academic journals [e.g. Lichtenstein, 1996; Lichtenstein & Swatman, 1997; Whitman et 
al, 1999; Siau et al, 2002] to information security websites1
 
, were consulted to derive a list of 
those issues that should be covered in an acceptable use policy. Ultimately, eight distinct 
policy areas of best practice were identified, resulting in the AUP framework described in 
table 2. These eight distinct issues were ultimately chosen because given their recognised 
importance and generic nature, they might be considered to comprise the minimum 
requirements for any well designed AUP document. However, as our primary aim was to 
provide a thorough overview of the coverage of universities acceptable use policies, the 
proposed AUP framework was only designed to serve as a point of departure for our 
research. Consequently, when reviewing our sample of AUPs, whenever a distinct new area 
of policy coverage was identified, it was given a new code, together with a brief description, 
and added to our framework, so that we could ultimately build a more complete picture of 
policy coverage. As will be demonstrated, in the next section, many of the reviewed policies 
ultimately covered a far wider range of distinct policy areas, than those minimum 
requirements, as presented in table 2. 
Table 2: AUP Framework – Policy Coverage Areas 
Policy Area Description 
Access Management Covers issues such as who is authorised to use systems and corporate 
information; username and password management regulations and good 
practice guidelines 
Acceptable 
Behaviour  
Covers permitted user activities, such as work-related use of the systems and 
information, and internet usage in particular. Acceptable usage of email 
Unacceptable 
Behaviour 
Covers prohibited user activities, such as hacking, downloading illegal material, 
accessing illegal websites, dissemination of illegal or offensive material, 
sending bulk emails, harassment of other users, violating privacy of others 
users, dissemination of viruses, use of systems and/or corporate information 
commercial purposes, personal usage of systems and/or corporate information 
Licence Compliance Rules and regulations about software downloading, sharing and usage 
Roles and 
Responsibilities 
Explanation of the specific roles and responsibilities of users, system 
administrators, managers, and so on. 
User Monitoring Explanation of the organisation’s approach to monitoring of user activities (e.g. 
email monitoring) 
Sanctions for Policy 
Violations 
Explanation of the actions that will be taken in the event of a user breaching 
the Acceptable Use Policy 
Policy Management Details of responsibilities and procedures for policy management and 
maintenance 
 
4 Research Findings 
The task of identifying a university’s AUP document was not always straightforward, due to 
the very significant variations in the terminology used. Consequently, very large numbers of 
                                            
1  Influential not-for-profit organisations: Becta a British government agency leading the national drive to 
ensure the effective and innovative use of technology throughout learning; the London Advice Services 
Alliance (LASA) a charity providing ICT advice, consultancy and easy to read resources to the voluntary 
and community services; Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC) for the UK Further and Higher 
Education Funding Councils; The SANS (SystemAdmin, Audit, Network, Security) Institute, which is  
a cooperative research and education organization, specialising in information security. 
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on-line security documents often had to be reviewed in order to determine which one 
primarily addressed the acceptable use of information resources. The challenge of tracking 
down the AUP was exacerbated because the documents were not always stored in obvious, 
or easy to access, locations, on university web-sites. Ultimately, 65 policies were found and 
critically reviewed, and the key features of their objectives, structure and content are 
discussed below. 
 
4.1 Objectives of the AUP 
Having successfully isolated the policy document that addressed the ‘acceptable usage of IT 
resouces’, the introductory statements in each policy were a useful means of revealing a 
university's broad outlook with regard to the acceptable use of its systems. It is reassuring to 
report that best practice is clearly being followed with regard to the requirement to clearly 
state the policy’s purpose [Kilman & Stamp, 2005], as all the reviewed policies contained an 
explicit articulation of their objectives. Whilst there was some variation in stated objectives of 
the reviewed policies, there was a very high degree of commonality, and the following is a 
highly representative example: 
 
The purpose of this policy is to deliver an information technology infrastructure that 
effectively supports the basic missions of the university in teaching, research and 
administration. In particular this policy aims to promote the following goals:  
i. to ensure the integrity, reliability, availability, and superior performance of IT 
systems;  
ii. to ensure that use of IT systems is consistent with the principles and values that 
govern the use of other University facilities and services; 
iii. to ensure that IT systems are used for their intended purposes; 
iv. to establish processes for addressing policy violations and sanctions for violators. 
 
This statement is important in a number of key respects. It clearly shows that the policy 
relates to an institution’s complete IT infrastructure, and not just its Internet and networked 
resources; it reinforces the point that the policy should reflect both intended and 
unacceptable behaviours, and perhaps most importantly, it indicates that the policy should 
ultimately be focussed towards improving the performance of the institution’s IT systems. An 
important area in which there was very little evidence that policies’ were conforming to best 
practice relates to the need to tailor them to take account of organisational objectives and 
risks [Stewart, 2000; Palmer et al, 2001]. Policy objectives were typically stated in a fairly 
generic and predictable manner, with very little indication of any contextual tailoring. 
Although there was a relatively high degree of consistency, in terms of stated objectives of 
the reviewed policies, there was a far higher degree of variation with regard to the policies’ 
positioning arrangements and coverage, but still no clear evidence of tailoring, as discussed 
in more detail in the remainder of this section.  
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4.2 Positioning of the AUP 
To facilitate the acceptable use of organisational IT, the AUP must be well positioned both in 
terms of its naming and its relationship to other forms of security documentation, so that 
acceptable usage guidance is comprehensive and easily accessible. Indeed, in terms of the 
naming of these policies, there was evidence of a very high degree of variation. As can be 
seen from the results presented in table 3, whilst the ‘Acceptable Use Policy’ is by far the 
most commonly used name, there are still eight other alternative titles, which have been 
adopted, amongst our sample of universities. This may not be a problem to the many users 
who will only be aware of the existence of this policy because their employers have explicitly 
drawn it to their attention. However, as higher education is a highly dynamic and increasingly 
multicultural sector, it is now common for researchers and academics to move between 
institutions, and even between countries, on a fairly frequent basis. Consequently, it would 
be helpful if a common terminology were adopted, so that individual employees can become 
acclimatised to the fact that it is an institution’s AUP that sets the standard for their 
computing behaviours. Moreover, if the appellation ‘Acceptable Use Policy’ were to become 
more commonly used across all institutions, operating within the global Higher education 
sector, then it would help to promote the AUP brand, and underline its importance. The other 
important insight to be gleaned from table 3, is that although the vast majority of the sample 
of universities studied [93%] had some form of documentation that was clearly and explicitly 
focused upon promoting the ‘acceptable use’ of information resources, the adoption of this 
particular policy document is by no means universal. 
 
In terms of its positioning, with respect to other forms of security documentation, it becomes 
clear that the AUP is but one of a growing portfolio of policies / guidelines, and procedures 
(see table 4). In addition to their primary policy on the ‘accepted use’ of computing and 
information resources, the surveyed Universities have a number of ancillary policies, which 
are then further supplemented by tailored guidelines and/or procedures. Herein lies a major 
problem for both systems professionals and users, working within the university sector, as 
the majority of these ancillary policies and guidelines are not explicitly referenced from the 
acceptable use policy. Consequently, should a user wish to find guidance on their 
institution’s stance on email or copyright infringement, there may well be significant 
confusion as to the which document[s] should be referenced. The existing literature 
recognises the need for organisations to develop an explicit framework of security policies, 
which clearly demonstrates the relationship between security policies and other security 
related documentation, such as standards, guidelines and procedures [Palmer et al, 2001; 
Kilman & Stamp, 2005]. The results of our study indicate that whilst frameworks of security 
documentation are evolving within the HE sector, they are by no means explicit and obvious 
to the user of such documentation. Consequently, these findings have important implications 
for best practice in that they highlight the need for all organisations to ensure that their 
policies, standards and procedures are explicitly cross referenced to all related security 
documents. 
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Table 3: Country breakdown and Naming of AUP and AUP-related documentation 
Policy  
Title 
USA UK Australia Canada Hong 
Kong 
New 
Zealand 
Ireland Total 
Acceptable 
Use Policy 24 2 4 2 2 1 0 35 
Info. Tech.  
Policy 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Code of 
Conduct 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 3 
AU / IT 
Guidelines 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
AU / IT 
Regulations 0 10 1 0 0 0 0 11 
AU / IT 
Rules 
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Conditions of 
Use 2 3 0 1 0 0 0 6 
Ethics  
Policy 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
Info Security 
Policy 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
No obvious 
AU Policy 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
 
Table 4: Ancillary IT Policies Breakdown per Country 
Policy Type USA UK Australia Canada Hong 
Kong 
New 
Zealand 
Ireland Totals 
Information Security 29 7 5 1 0 1 1 44 
Email 19 8 6 2 0 1 1 37 
Privacy 14 0 2 1 3 0 0 20 
E-commerce 6 0 2 0 0 0 0 8 
Copyright 16 3 2 1 0 0 0 22 
Guidelines/Procedures 24 15 6 2 3 0 1 51 
Standards 7 5 1 1 0 0 0 14 
Data Protection 2 7 0 0 0 0 0 9 
Procurement 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 
Infrastructure 15 8 4 2 2 1 1 33 
Web/Domain 18 3 5 1 1 0 1 29 
Web Publishing 6 5 1 0 0 0 1 13 
Others 27 14 7 3 3 1 1 56 
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4.3 Coverage of the AUP 
The analysis of specific security management issues addressed in the universities' security 
documentation, only considered the institutions’ core acceptable use policy, and therefore 
any supplementary policies / guidelines / procedures were not explicitly reviewed. Each 
acceptable use policy was thoroughly reviewed to determine its coverage of the key usage 
issues, as highlighted in table 2.  In some cases, a policy might have referred a reader to a 
supplementary policy, in which case this was deemed to be explicit coverage as the 
reference point was from the core ‘acceptable use’ policy.  Issues covered in separate 
policies or procedures, but not explicitly mentioned in the ‘acceptable use’ policy, were not 
deemed to constitute explicit coverage in our examination, as it can be argued that the AUP 
should be the point of departure for addressing all acceptable usage issues.   
 
As can be seen from the results of the study presented in table 5, no one individual policy 
area was common to our complete sample of university policies. Whilst access management 
and sanctions for policy violations are covered in the majority of policies, most issues are 
covered in only about half of the policies reviewed. It is perhaps not surprising, or even 
concerning, that there is a certain amount of variability of the content, within the reviewed 
policies, as it might indicate that universities are tailoring their policies to their own specific 
organisational circumstances, rather than blindly following the prescriptions from the 
literature, as summarised in table 2. However, given these documents are primarily designed 
to communicate / promote acceptable behaviours, it is rather more disturbing that so few 
explicitly address acceptable behaviour, and by no means all policies highlight unacceptable 
behaviours. It is also interesting to note that whilst less than two-thirds of the sample [40/65] 
explicitly articulate unacceptable behaviours, the vast majority [56 / 65] specify the sanctions 
for unacceptable behaviours, even if the form of these undesirable actions isn’t always 
stated. The remainder of this section briefly highlights some of the other more interesting 
insights to be gained from a review of these core issues. 
 
In the relatively few policies in which ‘acceptable use’ is explicitly addressed, it is typically 
done through broad generalisations, rather than clear examples. As a result they simply 
state that acceptable use is such use that supports the research, education, administrative 
and other functions of the university. They also typically emphasise the need for acceptable 
use to respect the value and intended use of human and electronic resources as well as 
respect intellectual property, data ownership and users rights to privacy and freedom from 
intimidation. Only one University provided clear examples of acceptable behaviour, 
highlighting practices such as: ‘if you check your emails from another person's computer you 
should log off after finishing your activity and ensure that your password has not been saved 
on the computer’. Whereas acceptable use was given fairly short shrift, unacceptable 
behaviour was generally addressed more fully. The most commonly highlighted 
unacceptable behaviours are: transmitting viruses or chain emails, viewing pornography, 
harassment, defamatory activities, vandalism of properties etc. Less common prohibitions 
included: political lobbying; the personal use of IT for commercial purposes; the use of 
resources for playing games; the accessing of date/match making sites, the unauthorised 
deletion of another person's news group posting. Against this backdrop, it can be argued 
that the AUP could play a far more explicit and proactive role in promoting desirable and 
effective security behaviours, rather than simply highlighting unacceptable behaviours. 
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Table 5: The coverage of Acceptable Use Policies 
Core Issue USA UK Austral-
ia 
Canada Hong 
Kong 
New 
Zealand 
Ireland Total 
Access 
Management 
21 14 6 3 3 1 1 49 
Acceptable 
Behaviour 
5 2 1 0 0 0 0 8 
Unacceptable 
Behaviour 
19 12 5 2 2 0 0 40 
License 
Compliance 
18 11 6 3 2 1 1 42 
Roles and 
Responsibilities 
14 9 5 0 2 0 0 30 
User Monitoring 16 8 6 3 2 1 0 36 
Sanctions for 
Policy Violations 
25 17 6 3 3 1 1 56 
Policy 
Management 
19 3 6 2 0 1 0 32 
 
The sections on monitoring tended to be written in very general terms, basically focusing on 
the university's right to monitor emails and data for security purposes, as well as in case of 
any investigation into policy violations. Most also stress that when credible evidence of illegal 
or otherwise impermissible activity is discovered, then appropriate action will be taken. A 
section on ‘sanctions’ is also very commonly found, but once again, its content tends to be 
very general and predictable. The clear majority of universities tend not to be explicit on what 
these sanctions might be, but prefer more general statements such as: ‘individuals found to 
have violated this policy may be subject to penalties including temporary or permanent 
reduction or elimination of some or all IT privileges’. In some cases, it is also stressed that 
policy violations can, depending on their seriousness, lead to dismissal from the university, 
and possibly criminal prosecution. Six universities also explicitly state the possibility of users 
having to reimburse any costs which may arise from the breaches of the policy. Only one 
policy could be found in which a clear hierarchy of sanctions was articulated, as follows: 
 
‘Where a breach of the policy is established, but not referred to a law 
enforcement agency, one or more of the following penalties may be imposed on a 
person responsible for involved in the breach: (a) warning, (b) formal written 
warning, (c)restriction or termination of access to ICT resources, the summary 
suspension of such access and/or rights pending further actions, including 
disciplinary action, (d) the requirement to provide compensation for any improper 
use of, or damage to ICT, (e) disciplinary sanctions, which may include dismissal 
of an employee, termination of a contract or the suspension or expulsion of a 
student from a course of study.’ 
 
Policy management is not always explicitly covered as a separate section, in the policy's 
main body, but its practice can often be inferred by reviewing the policies’ history. Most 
policies appear to have a two to three year review cycle, although there are quite a few that 
haven't been modified since their inception (which could be anything up to ten years ago). A 
few universities explicitly mention a review cycle, but it is not always clear that this process 
has been enacted. With regard to who is responsible for the issue, maintenance and 
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approval of the policy it seems that the management of the policy is typically the 
responsibility of a Chief Information Officer, whereas overall approval for the policy rests with 
a higher level (e.g. Provost, President, Pro Vice Chancellor, etc)  
 
In addition to the core issues addressed in an AUP, as summarised in table 5, it was also 
possible to identify other important areas of policy coverage, as presented in table 6. A high 
proportion of our sample made explicit reference to external laws and policies that a user 
should be aware of when using the host institutions’ IT infrastructure. There was obviously a 
very strong national orientation, with regard to those laws most frequently referenced in the 
AUPs. For example, explicit mentions of the following laws were common in the policies of 
US universities: Federal Copyright Laws, Federal Wire Fraud Laws, Federal Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Law, and the Federal Child Pornography Law. By contrast, in the UK 
policies, the Data Protection Act, the Copyright, Design and Patterns Act, the Computer 
Misuse Act and the Pornography Law were the most commonly encountered Acts of 
Parliament.  
 
Where the personal use of IT is explicitly covered in AUP, it is typically covered at a very 
general level, by highlighting that whilst a small amount of personal usage of IT resources 
may be permitted, it mustn’t adversely interfere with an employee’s work obligations. In a 
small number of cases, the personal use of IT is addressed more fully. For example one 
university policy states:  
 
‘Use of resources for personal purposes is not generally permitted unless such use is 
kept to a minimum. Such a minimal use is considered appropriate for the personal use 
of email, the Internet and other university resources. Limited personal use is defined as 
use which incurs minimal additional expense to the university, is infrequent and brief, 
does not interfere with the operations of the university and does not violate any 
university policy or state/federal legislation and regulation.  
 
This same policy also sought to justify its stance on personal usage, by providing explicit 
guidance to users on how much a variety of typical personal usage activities might cost the 
university. Another policy makes the important point that as it may be very difficult, in a 
university context, to distinguish between personal and professional use of information 
resources, the University will rely on its employees to act ‘responsibly and judiciously’. 
 
Table 6: Extra Issues [specific sections] in the Acceptable Use Policies 
Issue USA UK Austral-
ia 
Canada Hong 
Kong 
New 
Zealand 
Ireland Total 
Security 10 5 1 1 0 0 0 17 
Email 
Regulations 
8 4 2 0 1 0 1 16 
Disclosure of 
Information 
7 4 1 1 0 1 0 14 
Inappropriate 
Material 
4 5 4 3 1 0 1 18 
Personal Use of 
IT 
22 9 5 3 0 1 1 41 
External Laws / 
Policies 
21 12 5 2 2 1 1 44 
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Finally, whilst the sampled AUPs do cover a great deal of ground, we were rather surprised 
to find absolutely no mention of the following recent technologies / developments which 
might have been usefully addressed: social networking sites (Facebook, Twitter, Beebo etc); 
Skype and other Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOiP) applications, Internet TV (e.g. BBC 
iPlayer) or file sharing websites. Whilst this is a potentially worrying finding, it is not greatly 
surprising, given the relative infrequency with which Universities’ review and update their 
acceptable use policies. Indeed, this paper makes a further important contribution by 
highlighting that too often, universities are failing to follow established best practice, which 
suggests that all security policies should be reviewed and revised at regular intervals 
[Palmer et al, 2001]. 
 
5. Discussion  
The flexibility and power of modern information technologies, in general, and the Internet, in 
particular, pose all organisations with a very real dilemma [Nolan, 2005]. On the one hand, 
unfettered access to information resources can facilitate creative, constructive and ultimately 
productive behaviours. Unfortunately, on the other, unconstrained access to information 
technology can result in a variety of wasteful, inappropriate and even destructive behaviours 
[Stanton et al, 2009]. Consequently, there is a pressing need to strike a balance between the 
availability and the security of corporate information resources, and well designed security 
documentation has a vital role to play in this process [Doherty & Fulford, 2006]. Although the 
acceptable use policy has an increasingly important role to play in ensuring that all corporate 
information resources are used appropriately and productively [Nolan, 2005], it has not been 
the subject of a great deal of focused academic scrutiny. 
 
Against this backdrop, this study makes some important new contributions, as it is more 
clearly focused, up to date, and comprehensive, than previous studies, in this area. Most 
importantly, it can be concluded that the wide diversity of disparate policies and standards in 
use is unlikely to foster a coherent approach to promoting acceptable user behaviours, either 
within specific organisations, or across the sector. The fact that a variety of important issues 
have been omitted from a large proportion of the reviewed policies is greatly worrying, as it 
suggests that many critical aspects of security management are being left to chance, rather 
than being proactively and responsibly managed. It can be legitimately argued that as the 
AUP should be tailored to fit its organisational context, variations in its content are only to be 
expected. However, we would counter that this variation should come within the content of 
each specific core issue [see table 2], rather than in the very presence of each of these 
issues. For example, we would expect all AUPs to explicitly address unacceptable 
behaviour, but we would expect that the discussion of these behaviours be tailored to the 
requirements of a specific organisational context. As well as finding gaps in the coverage of 
policies, we also identified some issues that have not been considered within previous 
studies of the content of the AUP. More specifically, email regulations, the disclosure of 
Information, and the personal use of IT are all issues that have been shown to be making a 
useful contribution within the AUP. 
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This study also makes a further important contribution by demonstrating that the AUP is just 
one document, amongst a growing proliferation of security standards, procedure, policies 
and laws, the majority of which are attempting to moderate or improve the users’ utilisation 
of corporate information resources, in some specified way. This poses a significant problem 
for senior IT and security managers, how can they best position and design their AUP so 
that it provides a fairly comprehensive, yet accessible, source of general user information, 
whilst also integrating effectively with other security documents, so that less common or 
more sophisticated issues can also be addressed. A final important contribution of this paper 
lies in its clarification of the focus of the AUP. Most previous empirical studies have focussed 
purely upon organisation’s Internet policies [Lichtenstein, 1996; Lichtenstein & Swatman, 
1997; Siau et al, 2002], and have therefore missed those important elements of the AUP, 
that address the acceptable usage of information resources that are not accessed through 
the web. For example, issues such as licence compliance, copyright issues, password 
control, access management and privacy apply to all corporate information resources, not 
just those accessed via the Internet.  
 
If, as was suggested earlier, the user really is the weakest link in the information security 
chain [Schneier, 2000], then it is important to reflect upon the AUP’s role in reinforcing this 
link. On the face of it, it can be argued that the widespread adoption of the AUP suggests 
that institutions are attempting to provide users with the knowledge they need to proactively 
use and manage their information resources more effectively and securely. However, the 
strong emphasis on policy violations and sanctions, supported by lists of unacceptable user 
behaviours, and laws that mustn’t be infringed, it might equally be inferred that the AUP’s 
primary role is to provide the justification for disciplining employees, if it should be found that 
they have been infringed the policy. Indeed, we would argue that as in far too many cases 
the emphasis is on what users mustn’t do, rather than on what than can and should do, it 
can be inferred that the AUP has been designed to protect the host institution, rather than 
proactively educating the user. This interpretation is supported by the work of Albrechtsen 
[2007], who concluded that too often users don’t feel that they have the knowledge to play a 
proactive role in promoting effective and desirable security behaviours. Indeed, there may 
well be simple to articulate prescriptions with regard to issues, such as: the cautious use of 
e-mail; effective password etiquette; the reporting of unexpected situations and the handling 
of sensitive information [Albrechtsen, 2007], that could be easily and productively 
incorporated into the AUP. Consequently, it will be important for academic researchers and 
university managers, alike, to explore how the content and structure might best be modified 
so that it places more explicit emphasis on educating the user and promoting effective 
behaviour, whilst still performing its important role in providing a mechanism for dealing with 
unacceptable behaviours.  
 
There are a number of other practical lessons to be gained from this study, which may help 
managers improve the information security climate within their organisations. Although there 
is a great deal of variability across this sample of policies, in terms of their content and 
structure, it is possible to detect some areas of commonalty in their phrasing and language. 
It is, therefore, important to question how these policies are being formulated. If they are 
being created by simply cutting and pasting chunks from policy pro formas or other 
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organisation’s policies, then it is unlikely that a great deal of thought is going into their 
formulation. Consequently, we would recommend that AUPs be created from first principles, 
to ensure that they are explicitly tailored to their organisation’s specific requirements / 
circumstances. Moreover, the fact that policies are so infrequently updated, is worrying, and 
would suggest that organisations need to adopt a far more proactive approach to their 
review and maintenance. Finally, the proliferation of user-related security documentation 
suggests that organisations need to pay far more attention to managing it more holistically, 
to ensure that all security information is well integrated, and easy to find and assimilate. If 
security documentation is not readily accessible, then it can be easily subverted or ignored 
[Herath & Rao, 2009b], often with disastrous consequences. 
 
Concluding Remarks  
The work presented in this paper makes an important contribution to the information security 
literature as it presents one of the first, if not the first, objective, rigorous and independent 
evaluations of the positioning and content of authentic acceptable use policies, within a well-
bounded organizational setting. In so doing, it highlights some worrying deficiencies in terms 
of the explicit coverage of policy issues and the ability of organizations to effectively cross-
reference and integrate their portfolios of information security documentation. Research into 
the adoption of sophisticated policies, within a dynamic organizational context, is an 
ambitious undertaking, and therefore contains a number of inherent limitations. In particular, 
the adoption of the survey format restricts the range of issues and constructs that can be 
explored, and does not give the researcher the opportunity to explore why specific decisions, 
with respect to the structure and coverage of the policy, were taken. To this end, a series of 
follow-up interviews and focus groups are currently being planned, to help interpret and 
explain the results of our documentation review. In particular, we are keen to explore how 
the content of the policies reflects, and aligns with, the universities’ strategic planning 
process. It will also be important to replicate this study in a variety of other sectors to test the 
generalisability of our findings. A further important aspect of our future research agenda will 
be to monitor how this sample of AUPs changes over a period of time, so that we can gain 
some insights both into the updating mechanisms for these policy documents, and also 
monitor the way in which security concerns are dynamically changing. Finally, although it 
may never be possible, or indeed beneficial, to try to include complete lists of acceptable 
behaviour in AUPs, future research might be usefully focused upon identifying and validating 
those specific user behaviours and best practice, that if enacted can deliver real 
improvements to organisational security. As the project unfolds, it is anticipated that the 
findings will help organizations to better understand the value of security policies and to 
pinpoint the policy areas for prioritisation.  
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